“I shifted, near the beginning of this discussion of the value of friendship, from the question of what it is for friendship to be valuable to the question of what is involved in valuing friendship. These are different questions. People value many things that are not in fact valuable. What I want to suggest, however, is that the claim that friendship is valuable is best understood as the claim that it is properly valued, that is to say, that the reasons recognized by someone who values friendship are in fact good reasons. Consider, as a contrast with friendship, “fanship”: the state of being a devoted admirer of some famous person, such as a movie star, a singer, or an athlete. Some people value fanship. That is, they think that being a fan makes life better, more enjoyable, and more interesting. They may also think that it is important to be a good fan: that there is good reason, say, to see all the movies in which their favorite star appears as soon as they come out, and to defend the star when others criticize her, and that it would be a great thing to see the star in person, even from a great distance. According to the account of value I am suggesting, to hold that fanship is not valuable is just to hold that these reasons are not good reasons, or at least that a person who gave them great weight in shaping his life would be making a mistake. On the other hand, to hold that fanship, or friendship, is valuable is to hold that the reasons involved in valuing it are good ones and that it is therefore appropriate to give this notion an important place in shaping one’s life.” - T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other
Beneath the calm surface of this passage, Scanlon advances a quietly radical claim: that valuing is not a feeling but a form of reasoning, and that to call something valuable is therefore to make an argument that can be wrong. The contrast he draws between friendship and "fanship" is not an observation about which attachments run deeper or feel nobler. It is a precision instrument, built to demonstrate that what we value is answerable to reasons - that a person can be sincerely, expertly, wholeheartedly devoted to something and still, in centering a life on it, be making a mistake. The passage's underlying message is that the hardest task is not to feel strongly but to value rightly, and in the right proportion.
The argument turns on a distinction most people never pause to draw. Scanlon separates what it is for friendship to be valuable from what is involved in valuing it. The first phrase names a normative fact about the world; the second names a psychological act of a person. To value friendship, on his account, is to recognize certain considerations as reasons - to treat "she is my friend" as grounds for loyalty, attention, and sacrifice. But recognizing something as a reason and that reason actually being good are two different matters, and the gap between them is where his entire view lives. He marks that gap with one quiet sentence: people value many things "that are not in fact valuable." Valuing is fallible. The act can misfire even when it is sincere.
This is why Scanlon redefines the valuable as the properly valued. To say friendship is valuable, for him, is not to point to some further property glowing within it - a hidden quality the friendship possesses in addition to its ordinary features. It is to claim that the reasons recognized in valuing it are "in fact good reasons." Value, on this account, does not sit above reasons and hand them down; it dissolves into them. The thing is not first valuable and therefore reason-giving - it is reason-giving, and that is all its being valuable amounts to. The small phrase "in fact" enforces the point, driving a wedge between believing one's reasons are good and their being good, and locating value entirely on the far side of that wedge, beyond the reach of mere conviction.
The brilliance of the fanship example lies in how carefully it is built to fail. Scanlon constructs the fan as a structural twin of the friend: the fan has reasons (to see every film, to defend the star), holds commitments, recognizes standards for being a good fan, and is willing to let this devotion shape their life. Every formal feature of valuing is present. What is striking is the diagnosis Scanlon declines to give. He could have indicted fanship for being one-directional - the star does not know the fan exists, and nothing is owed or returned. That would have been the easy verdict. But he refuses. According to his theory, the defect of fanship cannot be that the relationship is unequal; it must be that the reasons are not good enough. By keeping the diagnosis at the level of reasons rather than relationship, Scanlon stays faithful to his own account: if value just is the goodness of reasons, then even the failure of a misplaced devotion has to be a failure of reasons, and nothing else.
Here the passage becomes more careful than it first appears. Scanlon does not simply declare the fan's reasons worthless. He writes that these reasons "are not good reasons, or at least" that a person who gave them "great weight in shaping his life would be making a mistake." That hedge - "or at least" - quietly opens a second possibility. Perhaps the fan's reasons are not nothing; perhaps the enjoyment is real and counts for something. The error, then, may not be valuing fanship at all, but valuing it too much - granting it the kind of weight that should be reserved for things that can bear it. The defect he names is one of proportion, not absence. This is why the vocabulary of "weight" matters: valuing wrongly is often not a matter of caring about the worthless, but of letting a small good occupy a large place.
The detail that one can be a good fan reveals a further layer. Even an attachment that may be mistaken has its own internal standards of excellence - the devoted fan does it well or badly. So "valuing well" splits into two questions the passage keeps from collapsing: whether one values the right things, and whether one values them skillfully. A person can be a flawless fan, meeting every internal standard of fandom, and still have made the prior error of building a life around fandom at all. The distinction Scanlon opened at the top - between the act of valuing and the worth of what is valued - returns here one level down, now dividing competence from correctness.
The word that carries the most weight in the passage is mistake. With it, Scanlon closes off the comfortable exit into taste. If valuing were mere preference, no one could value the wrong things; they could only value different things, and there would be nothing to be right or wrong about. By insisting that a person can err, Scanlon makes value an object of rational assessment rather than personal report. We become accountable for what we value in the same way we are accountable for what we believe - answerable to whether the reasons hold, not merely to the sincerity with which we hold them.
The passage ends on its quiet positive counterpart. To hold something valuable, Scanlon writes, is to hold that it is "appropriate" to give it "an important place in shaping one's life." Appropriateness is fittingness - the right response, proportioned to the reasons. It is the calm opposite of the mistake: where error is disproportion, value is the warrant for a fitting weight. And the recurring image of "shaping one's life" tells us why any of this matters. Value is not an abstraction to be catalogued; it is what we permit to organize a life. To be mistaken about it is therefore not a small lapse of judgment but the slow misbuilding of a life around reasons that cannot carry it. The passage's underlying demand follows, and it is severe: it is not enough to love something, nor even to love it well. One must love what there is genuine reason to love, and only as much as the reasons can bear. Valuing is not the place where reasoning stops and feeling takes over. It is reasoning - conducted with a whole life as the stake.